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Ethics in Legal Education: An
Augmentation of Legal Realism
Gerald R. Ferrera*
[T]he real justification of a rule of law, if there be one, is that it helps to bring
about a social end which we desire.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
INTRODUCTION
The integration of ethics into the law curriculum continues to pose
a formidable challenge to law professors who often express discom-
fort in developing ethical theory in case analysis as something alien
to traditional legal reasoning. This article takes the position that cov-
erage of ethics in legal education is a reasonable extension of the
"legal realism" movement of the 1930s. This argument is based upon
the doctrines of the founder of legal realism, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., and other legal scholars who contributed to the jurisprudential
school of "legal realism." Contemporary legal education ought to in-
tegrate the ethical paradigm into legal studies as an extension of the
traditional jurisprudence of legal realism. A thorough analysis of
case decisions demands such a conviction. The elimination of ethical
discussion from legal education assures loss of student value orienta-
tion and moral growth.
The purpose of this article is not to suggest that the law somehow
seeks out ethical theory for its epistemological justification. The eth-
ical paradigm2 serves to trace the rationale of the courts and en-
hances student comprehension of the ethical choices involved in the
decision-making process. Legal education should provide value
choices within the ethical paradigm as a way to reach alternative so-
cial results. The argument that proposes a legal analysis, which
* Professor and Chair, Law Department, Bentley College.
1. O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PA.
PERS 238 (1920).
2. See infra notes 60-91 and accompanying text.
omits the ethical perspective, conceals judicial value choices and mis-
construes the normative judgments of the courts. The utilization of
the ethical paradigm will assist both scholars and students in their
search for value choices present in decisional law.
This is hardly the first proposal that ethics is an appropriate and
necessary discipline to be synthesized with legal education.3 Never-
theless, this article demonstrates that ethical theory provides a way
to explain legal argument, which itself represents an extension of
legal realism. This is illustrated by a discussion of some of the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Court decisions within the context of the ethical
paradigm.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the legal realism
movement. Although the legal scholars who developed the move-
ment proferred various versions of its metaphysics, their consensus
reveals an aversion to the "rule of law" as the guiding principle of
jurisprudence. Instead, the primary focus of the legal realism move-
ment was legal education that would bring about politically desirable
social ends.
Part II briefly surveys the ethical paradigm and reviews its ethical
construct. This author suggests that some legal realists, unlike Jus-
tice O.W. Holmes, would have approved of ethical case analysis. The
article proposes that the ethical paradigm can be readily used in legal
education because of its adaptability to case analysis.
Part III offers a review of First Amendment cases from the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts using the ethical paradigm as an extension of
legal realism. This perspective suggests a methodology suitable to
case analysis, as ethics becomes relevant to legal education when con-
strued as an augmentation of legal realism. Part III further argues
that the omission of ethical analysis from case decisions prevents the
development of student value orientation and moral growth.
Part IV contends that the ethical paradigm is a logical extension of
legal realism, which applies to values not found in appellate court de-
cisions traditionally used in legal education. Extending legal realism
to include the ethical paradigm in case analysis will enhance moral
development and intensify the social, economic, and political aware-
ness of the student.
3. For an excellent discussion of the role of ethics in business education and the
scholars who have contributed to that movement, see Conry & Nelson, Business Law
and Moral Growth, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (1989). Conry argues that legal education
should promote moral growth in students. Id. at 36.
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LEGAL REALISM
A. Justice Holmes' Early Attack on Legal Formalism
Justice Holmes has been characterized by legal scholars as "histori-
cally significant for his contribution to the subversion of an untena-
ble orthodoxy."4 This repudiation is a reference to legal
fundamentalism, which embraced the rule of law as the guiding stan-
dard of jurisprudence. Holmes' seminal work, The Common Law,
was published when he was a thirty-nine-year-old professor at
Harvard Law School. It is perhaps best known for its often cited
language:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt neces-
sities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitous of pub-
lic policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in deter-
mining the rules by which men should be governed.5
Justice Holmes would argue that decisional law should reflect reality
and at some level become public policy, which incorporates the evolv-
ing social arrangements of a free society. This theory contradicted
the classical legal reasoning of the late nineteenth century, which
viewed case law as apolitical and unconcerned with social reality.
The latter position posits a legal landscape contoured by the legisla-
ture rather than discovered through the judicial process. Holmes' fa-
mous dissent in Lochner v. New York, announcing that "general
propositions do not decide concrete cases," 6 became a rallying cry for
the nascent movement of legal realism opposed to classical legal
orthodoxy.
Justice Holmes' essay, The Path of the Law,7 written while he was
a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, emphasized
the objective of legal study as the prediction of a judge's decision.8
4. KAPLAN, ATIYAH & VETrER, HOLMES AND THE COMMON LAW: A CENTURY
LATER, THE HOLMES LECTURES, 1981, at 81 (Harvard Law School, Occasional Pamphlet
No. Ten, 1983) [hereinafter HOLMES]. Professor Vetter's position is that Holmes had
little to contribute to legal reasoning by way of moral or economic analysis. Id.
5. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963) [hereinafter COMMON
LAW].
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (sup-
porting the constitutionality of social legislation and stating, "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics .... [A] constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism ... or of
laissez faire.") Id. at 75-76.
7. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) [hereinafter The
Path]. (arguing that historical circumstances shape the law rather than logical
necessity).
8. Id. at 460-61.
To Holmes, knowing how a judge would rule on a particular set of
facts became more significant than the rule of law. Holmes abhorred
the juxtaposition of law and ethics and admitted his way of analyzing
a contract "stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous
to get as much ethics into the law as they can."9 Holmes' theory of a
contract excluded a duty to perform and emphasized the contract as
an allocation of risk.1O He substituted an "objective" approach to
contracts with the "subjective" approach followed by the courts.'"
Lawyers were told by Holmes not to confuse morality with law.12 To
Holmes, the lawyer of the future was "the man of statistics and the
master of economics."13 Ethics and the rule of law should not con-
taminate the operative factual consideration of a case, posited
Holmes. Holmes insisted that "[t]o have doubted one's own first
principles is the mark of a civilized man." 14 He would refer to his
own beliefs as "can't helps" insisting that others were under no obli-
gation to share them.15 Holmes was an agnostic who adopted the
Darwinian social philosophy of survival of the fittest.16 This evolu-
tionary philosophy may account for his statement that "[t]he impor-
tant phenomenon is. . . the justice and reasonableness of a decision,
not its consistency with previously held views." 17 Law, according to
Holmes, "should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of
the community, whether right or wrong."' 8 Hardly the stuff of ethi-
cal theory! Holmes' basis of morality was the conception of law as an
evolving social policy, rather than as a theory of the ethics of social
justice.
B. The Development of Legal Realism in the 1930s
The Realists borrowed from Holmes a vision of law as an opera-
9. Id. at 462.
10. Id. at 472-74. See also COMMON LAW, supra note 5, at 334-36.
11. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 35 (1974) (arguing a modern ap-
proach for contract liability that supports Holmes' "objectivist theory" that contract is
being absorbed into the mainstream of tort law under the doctrines of quasi-contract,
unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel). Most contract cases can be brought
under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) Contracts, which states in part:
"[Qibligations and remedies based on -reliance are not peculiar to the law of contracts
.... Reliance is also a significant feature of numerous rules in the law of negligence,
deceit and restitution." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment a (1979).
12. The Path, supra note 7, at 461.
13. Id. at 469. Holmes called for more empirical social science research in the law
and stated: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV." Id.
14. O.W. HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 307 (1920).
15. See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 69.
16. Id. at 97.
17. M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882,
155-57 (1963).
18. See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 36.
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tional process that reflects the current reality. The 1930s produced
two provocative texts on legal realism: Karl Llewellyn's The Bramble
Bush 19 and Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind.20
Llewellyn was a thirty-seven-year-old law professor who had
taught at Columbia Law School for seven years before publishing The
Bramble Bush. Llewellyn is known to both lawyers and law students
as the principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code. In 1930,
he published a law review article on the new realist jurisprudence,
which criticized Roscoe Pound, renowned scholar and Dean of
Harvard Law School.21 Dean Pound's response22 attacked the Real-
ists and resulted in Professor Llewellyn's publication of a survey of
twenty legal scholars from Yale and Columbia on their opinions of
the accuracy of Pound's argument. The census created a heated de-
bate among law professors on the nature of legal realism. 23 Pound
was a pre-World War I legal progressive and founder of the school of
sociological jurisprudence. His "Liberty of Contract" paper of 1909
argued for the connection of the social sciences with law. Dean
Pound wrote:
[Tihe entire separation of jurisprudence from the other social sciences... was
not merely unfortunate for the science of law on general considerations, in
that it necessitated a narrow and partial view but was in large part to be
charged with the backwardness of law in meeting social ends... and the gulf
between legal thought and popular matters of social reform. Not a little of
the world-wide discontent with our present legal order is due to modes of...
juridical method[s] which result from want of "team-work" between jurispru-
dence and the other social sciences.
2 4
Dean Pound's disapproval of the Roosevelt administration's New
Deal political and social programs accounts for his controversy with
19. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
20. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) [hereinafter MODERN MIND].
21. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 CoLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930).
22. Pound, The Call For A Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1931).
23. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). See also Hull, Some Realism About the Llewellyn-Pound
Exchange Over Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence, 1927-1931, 1987
Wis. L. REV. 921 (discussing Llewellyn's failure to fully articulate his vision of Realism
by providing only a partial list of Realists to Pound).
24. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (part 1), 24
HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911); Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910) (Pound suggested the modern teacher of law should be a student of sociology,
economics, and politics to remedy the backwardness of law in meeting social
problems). See generally R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1924) (Pound wrote "[a]ll dis-
cussion of the relation of . . . jurisprudence to ethics, goes back to the Greek
thinkers").
some of the legal realist scholars of the 1930s.25 However, both Pro-
fessor Llewellyn and Dean Pound claimed loyalty to Justice
Holmes.26 Recall that Holmes left little room for emotion or feeling
in his philosophy. Holmes had written that "at the bottom of all pri-
vate relations, however tempered by sympathy and all the social feel-
ings, is a justifiable self-preference."27 He did not believe in the
natural law or moral ideas as the legal framework of society. 28 The
legal realist saw Holmes' jurisprudence as a means to resolve "[t]he
conflict between fixed, mechanical concepts of law and dynamic, pro-
gressive ideas in politics." 29
Realism was a method of scrutinizing a transaction while letting it
dictate its own arrangements and rules rather than imposing exterior
regulations.30 It stimulated proposals for legal reform and value ori-
entation although such values were not found in the decisions of ap-
pellate courts or other materials commonly used in legal education.3 1
Professor Llewellyn believed that legal realism was not an ideology
or coherent legal philosophy, but rather a method or technique,
which could be used by legal scholars regardless of their philoso-
phy.32 He suggested that no scholar would have to adopt the method-
ology of legal realism as the single or even primary mode of
analysis.33 Professor Llewellyn wrote that all the Realists derived
their jurisprudence from Justice Holmes and declared that "Holmes
almost alone, has cracked open the law of these United States."34
Professor Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind attempted to
bring Dr. Sigmund Freud into the law and argued that law is the fa-
ther symbol in society. 35 His treatise was written when the United
States was still a pre-Freudian culture. Frank was undergoing psy-
choanalysis while he was writing this book and developed a new the-
25. See L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 45-66 (1986). But see
Hull, supra note 23 (indicating Pound may not have, personally, taken as conservative
a stand on these issues as he did in public). For a book review of Legal Realism at
Yale, 1927-1960, see Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435
(1989).
26. See Kaplan, Encounters With O.W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1838
n.58 (1983).
27. See COMMON LAW, supra note 5, at 38.
28. M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841-1870
213-14 (1957).
29. H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 374 (1950).
30. See Hull, supra note 23, at 966.
31. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). (ar-
guing that legal realism affected social change and legal reform by appealing to values
not found in appellate court decisions or other materials traditionally used in law
schools).
32. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 510 (1960).
33. Hull, supra note 23, at 959-60.
34. Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 485, 487 (1935).
35. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 13-31 (1930).
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ory of examining legal problems with a strong emphasis on factual
interpretation, rather than the application of rules of law. He in-
sisted that law was an unpredictable science. The Realists adopted
this reliance on facts and argued that what was morally right would
spring from an intense concentration of facts without interposing any
consideration of ethics.36 Frank, just as Llewellyn, idealized Holmes
and entitled a chapter of his book, Law and the Modern Mind, "Mr.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Completely Adult Jurist."3 7
It should be noted that legal realism was not without its critics.
Legal scholars of the 1940s found Justice Holmes to be amoral and
attacked legal realism as well as Holmes.3 8
However, what emerged from Holmes and was later refined by the
legal realists was a theory that law is indeed political and involved
with social phenomena. The legal realists related law to other disci-
plines. Their casebooks acknowledge the reliance on history, sociol-
ogy and psychiatry as relevant to legal education. 39 Although there
was an aversion to formal ethics, especially by Holmes and Frank,
the opening of the law by the legal realist provides room for case
analysis by a utilization of the ethical paradigm.
II. THE ETHICAL PARADIGM
A. Ethical Theory
Ethical theory is the study of the nature and justification of ethical
principles.4 0 From the generally accepted ethical theories that ap-
pear in ethics literature, principles can be developed that may apply
to case analysis. Ethical theory is generally divided into teleological
and deontological ethics. 41 All ethical arguments can be classified
under one of these theories:
(1) Teleology is derived from the Greek word "telos" meaning end
or consequences. Teleological theories are often called consequential-
ist theories and assert that the morality of an action is determined by
36. See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 11.
37. See MODERN MIND, supra note 20, at 253.
38. See e.g., Palmer, Hobbs, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569 (1945); Palmer,
The Totalitarianism of Mr. Justice Holmes: Another Chapter in the Controversy, 37
A.B.A. J. 809 (1951).
39. See L. KALMAN, supra note 25, at 229.
40. See T. BEAUCHAMP & N. BOWIE, ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS (1983).
41. See Comment, Outsider Trading - Morality and the Law of Securities Fraud,
77 GEO. L.J. 181, 194-96 (1988) (describing the two broad categories of ethical theory).
its consequences. 42 There are various kinds of teleological theories,
the most common of which are ethical egoism and utilitarianism.
Ethical egoism measures the morality of an act by how it maxi-
mizes the benefit for oneself or an institution.43 How others are af-
fected as a result of the act is irrelevant. This theory justifies actions
generally considered immoral, such as dumping toxic waste or filing
a fraudulent tax return.
Utilitarianism gauges the morality of an act by the determination
of its consequences upon all those affected by the act. This viewpoint
is commonly expressed as "the greatest good for the greatest
number." The theory weighs alternative courses of action to the act,
then chooses the option which maximizes the benefits for all con-
cerned. As a majoritarian paradigm, utilitarianism could lead to judi-
cial deference and neutrality by avoiding ethical confrontation. For
example, allowing police without probable cause to set up highway
roadblocks to check drivers for drunkenness may be in the best inter-
est of all concerned, but it abrogates the civil rights of individual citi-
zens to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment.44 Seen in such light, the United States Constitution is a
counter-majoritarian document.
(2) Deontological theory maintains that actions are not justified by
their consequences, since the action itself has intrinsic value beyond
its consequences. Derived from the Greek word meaning duty, deon-
tology claims that a morally right action must satisfy the demands of
justice in that it represents the rights of others, or because one has
promised to perform an act.45 Deontology provides, by way of exam-
ple, the ethical basis for the fulfillment of a contractual commitment.
A further explanation of deontology is found in the ethical theories
of Immanuel Kant. Kant argued that it is each individual's duty to
conduct himself rightly because moral duty is absolute and uncondi-
tional.46 Kant called this binding moral law a "categorical impera-
42. R. BUCHHOLZ, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS ETHICS
48-49 (1989).
43. See Kalin, On Ethical Egoism, in STUDIES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 26-27 (N.
Rescher ed. 1968).
44. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Court stated, "[b]y holding that no level of suspicion is necessary
before the police may stop a car for the purpose of preventing drunken driving, the
Court potentially subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing conduct by the
police. I would have hoped that before taking such a step, the Court would carefully
explain how such a plan fits within our constitutional framework." Id. at 2489.
45. W. HOFFMAN & J. MOORE, BUSINESS ETHICS 1-31 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing ethi-
cal paradigm).
46. See I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd trans. 1965)
and Fletcher, Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory: Law and Morality: A Kantian
Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 533 (1987).
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tive."47  According to Kant, only actions that are invariably
universalizable may be moral. Kant stated, "I ought never to act ex-
cept in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become
a universal law." 4 8 Our conduct ought to respect human beings as
ends in themselves. He argued, "[a]ct in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an
end."49 This principle, as the basis of human dignity, places all peo-
ple as full members of the human community and demands that we
take human rights seriously.50 Our legal principle of "equal opportu-
nity" supports that proposition.
Distributive justice involves the process used, generally by the
state, to fairly distribute benefits and resources to society. How this
is to be justly achieved presents a problem. Why should one person
deserve more than another? Do we decide exclusively on the basis of
the contribution that person has made to society? John Rawls, a pro-
fessor of philosophy at Harvard University, has advanced the ethical
theory of deontology based on the philosophy of Kant. His book, A
Theory of Justice,51 states that the purpose of his philosophy is "to
present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a
higher level.., the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant . . . [following] the guiding idea . . . that the principles of
justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original
agreement."52 Rawls argues that all people of goodwill would agree
on two principles of justice:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
47. See Fletcher, supra note 46, at 547 (equating the categorical imperative to the
moral law); Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 56
U. CIN. L. REV., 845, 855 (1988) ("the catagorical imperative: one should act pursuant to
a maxim that could be willed as a universal law"); West, Law, Rights, and Other To-
temic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freaud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 817, 820 n.11 (describing the categorical imperative as the "absolute law of
moral duty").
48. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 70 (Paton ed. 1969).
49. Id. at 96.
50. See generally, R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) (positing that to
take rights seriously one must treat all people as members of the human community
and the weaker members are entitled to the same concern and respect as the more
powerful).
51. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971). Rawls argues that we should eval-
uate social arrangements by imagining a "veil of ignorance" regarding our status in so-
ciety that would prevent us from distributing justice in a way that would benefit us at
the expense of others. Id.
52. Id. at 11.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to of-
fices and pogitions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.
5 3
One could consider the application of Rawls' ethical principles to the
Americans with Disabilities Act as well as the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Disabilities Act 54 prohibits discrimination against the esti-
mated 43 million Americans who suffer from a physical or mental
disability.5 5 Rawls' philosophy furthers collective social and eco-
nomic equality.
Although ethical theory gives further rationalization beyond this
brief survey,56 the principles of teleology and deontology may be used
as the basis for the ethical paradigm in case analysis.
B. The Ethical Paradigm as a Logical Augmentation
of Legal Realism
The ethical paradigm may be expressed as a method with which to
ethically analyze a case. A sedulous use of the ethical paradigm will
assure the student's understanding of the process. This author ar-
gues that legal realism provides, as stated by Karl Llewellyn, a
method or technique which can be used by legal scholars regardless
of their philosophy.5 7 Now that the law has been "crack[ed] open,"s8
there is room for the ethical paradigm as a method for case analysis
in legal education. Moral reasoning, although repugnant to Holmes,
would be an appropriate means to understand social responsibility by
today's legal realists. Why should teleology and deontology not be in-
tegrated with case discussion to stimulate moral awareness?59 Law
professors who utilize the ethical paradigm simply extend the juris-
prudence of the legal realists by viewing the law as both a political
and ethical construct with moral consequences.
53. Id. at 60.
54. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12231, 29 U.S.C.A. § 706, and scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1990)).
55. See Rights Bill for Disabled is Sent to Bush, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1990, at A6,
col. 1.
56. See generally, M. HOFFMAN, BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND CASES IN CORPO-
RATE MORALITY (1990); R. BUCHHOLZ, supra note 42; M. VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS,
CONCEPTS AND CASES (1988); T. BEAUCHAMP & N. BOWIE, supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text.
57. HuLL, supra note 23 at 959-60.
58. Llewellyn, supra note 21, at 487.
59. Conry & Nelson, supra note 3, at 24 (discussing experimental intervention for
learning ethics).
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III. ADAPTABILITY OF THE ETHICAL PARADIGM TO CASE ANALYSIS
A. The Burger Court
The Burger Court decided many cases during the Chief Justice's
tenure from 1969 to his retirement in 1986. One of its most signifi-
cant First Amendment decisions was Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,60 in which the defendant radio station broadcasted news of Ro-
senbloom's arrest for possession of pornography.61 The report stated
that as a result of Rosenbloom's arrest, the police had found a main
provider of obscene material.62 When Rosenbloom sued the radio
station for libel,63 the jury found in his favor and awarded him sub-
stantial damages. 64 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed and held that although Rosenbloom was not a public figure,
the Warren Court's New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6 5 standard ap-
plied.66 That rule, enunciated in a decision written by recently re-
tired Justice Brennan, states that libel suits may not be brought by
public officials unless they can prove "actual malice." 67 In Rosen-
bloom, Justice Brennan wrote that New York Times v. Sullivan
should extend to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if
the statement concerned matters of general or public interest.68
An application of the ethical paradigm to Rosenbloom would reveal
a teleological argument. The benefit of news to the general or public
interest outweighs the benefit to Rosenbloom's right to privacy. This
reflects a utilitarian analysis, which considers "the greatest good for
the greatest number." 69 According to that ethical principle, the mo-
rality of broadcasting a libelous statement is justified, in the absence
of actual malice, because the public interest demands that people
have a greater right to hear the news than the protection of an indi-
vidual's privacy.
This theory was later rejected by the Burger Court in Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc.,70 in which a policeman was convicted of murder and
60. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
61. Id. at 33.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 36-37.
64. Id. at 39-40.
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 32.
67. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 (i.e., libel published "with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
68. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44-45.
69. A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 250 (1987).
70. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
the victim's father retained Gertz to sue the policeman in a civil ac-
tion.71 An article in the John Birch Society magazine claimed that
the policeman's murder trial was a communist plot to weaken the lo-
cal police and implied that Gertz had a criminal record.72 When
Gertz sued for libel, the jury found in his favor.73 The court of ap-
peals set aside the verdict, ruling that the New York Times v. Sulli-
van standard as stated in Rosenbloom should apply.74 The Supreme
Court reversed, refusing to apply the New York Times test to private
individuals, and found for Gertz.75 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, held that although the states may establish the liability
standard in a libel suit, they may not impose strict liability for defam-
atory speech.76 The Court's dictum that constitutionally protects
opinion speech states:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
7 7
In Gertz, the Court supports the deontological ethics of a state stat-
ute that establishes a right to sue. One could find support in Gertz
for judicial approval of Kant's Categorical Imperative or Rawls' prin-
ciples of justice that each person should have an equal right to the
most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for
others.78 The underlying ethical theory is that our conduct ought to
respect human beings as ends in themselves.
B. The Rehnquist Court
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan named William Rehnquist Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Generally regarded as
the Court's most consistently conservative member, Rehnquist cited
Justice Holmes in the 1988 landmark decision of Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell.79 This classic First Amendment case involved Jerry Falwell
who sued Hustler Magazine based on a "parody" of a Campari li-
queur advertisement.8 0 Hustler Magazine copied the form and layout
71. Id. at 325.
72. Id. at 325-26. Gertz was called a "leftist" and a "communist Fronter." Id. at
326.
73. Id. at 328-29.
74. Id. at 330-32.
75. Id. at 351-52.
76. Id. at 347.
77. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
78. See J. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 60 and accompanying text.
79. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). See generally Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990); Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First
Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 423 (1988).
80. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 48.
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of the Campari ads and in an alleged interview stated that Falwell's
"'first time' was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his
mother in an outhouse."' At the bottom of the ad, in small print,
appeared the disclaimer "ad parody - not to be taken seriously."82
Since the Gertz dicta83 allows defamatory ridicule, Falwell pro-
ceeded on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, cited Gertz and
stated:
The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a "false" idea. As Justice
Holmes wrote, "when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe ... that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."8 5
The Court held that "public figures and public officials may not re-
cover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ...
without showing ... a false statement of fact which was made with
'actual malice.' . . . [S]uch a standard is necessary to give adequate
'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment."86
The ethical paradigm that applies to First Amendment jurispru-
dence is quite complex. To what extent should society regulate free
speech? Certainly the armed forces and secondary educational insti-
tutions regulate speech.8 7 Deontological theory would characterize
free speech as an action that possesses intrinsic value. Immanuel
Kant stated:
It would be ruinous for an officer in service to debate about the suitability or
utility of a command given to him by his superior: he must obey. But the
right to make remarks on errors in the military service and to lay them before
the public for judgment cannot equitably be refused him as a scholar.8 8
It appears that Kant would not approve of the media's right to pub-
81. Id.
82. Id,
83. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 46-48 (1965). "One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to an-
other is subject to liability for such emotional distress." Id at § 46.
85. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 51 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (other citations omitted).
86. Id. at 56.
87. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-73 (1988) (school
officials retain right to impose reasonable restrictions on student speech in high school
paper); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 359 (1980) (Air Force regulations that require
commander's approval before circulating petitions on base not violative of first
amendment).
88. I. KANT, WHAT Is ENLIGHTMENT? 85, 87 (L. Beck trans. 1959).
lish satire as superior to an individual's reputational rights since this
would treat the individual as a means to an end.8 9 However, does the
utilitarian principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number"
not demand that public discourse, including political satire, be en-
couraged as the essence of democratic self-governance?
Legal realism allows the relevancy of the ethical paradigm to es-
tablish value orientation not openly discussed in appellate decisions.
When Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Justice Holmes' dicta that "the
best test of truth is the power to get [it] accepted in the competition
of the market," he was establishing relativism as the basis of truth.90
Constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe suggests that we should
not "tilt the legal landscape in favor of some groups and against
others... [and] avoid the parochial fallacy of looking at the legal uni-
verse only through the eyes of those in power."91
Use of the ethical paradigm exposes the moral value of a decision
and assists the student's orientation toward moral growth.
IV. CONCLUSION
A comprehensive analysis of appellate decisions using the ethical
paradigm will enhance student appreciation of value choices as well
as their understanding of the courts' holdings. Legal realism, by de-
nouncing the formal rule of law that excluded moral and political
consequences, provides the legal commentator or law professor with
an opportunity to integrate insightful ethical analysis into case deci-
sions. Thus, as law professors consider whether an ethical issue is
relevant to a social end, the ethical paradigm becomes a crucial
method in discussing values not found in appellate decisions. This
process will intensify an understanding of the interrelationship be-
tween law and ethics. 92 Such an ethical inquiry will reevaluate the
social and moral meaning of decisions, especially as they relate to
those marginated from society and often judicially precluded from
legal recourse. As legal education moves from legal realism to the
ethical paradigm, it will stimulate moral growth and also heighten
political awareness.
Legal realism enlightened legal education from the 1920s to the
89. See I. KANT, supra note 48, at 61.
90. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 51 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
91. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1989).
92. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). The corporation...
may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropri-
ate to the responsible conduct of business, and ... may devote a reasonable amount of
resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes."
Id.
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1960s 9 3 and, to a lesser, yet considerable, extent, the critical legal
studies movement 94 of the 1960s to the 1980s.95 Ethical legalism
could be the enlightened movement of legal scholarship for the 1990s
and beyond. Perhaps no other theory is more suitable to reevaluate
the ethical issues confronting the country and the courts in the
twenty-first century.
93. See L. KALMAN, supra note 25 at 230 (stating that "[flor all its innovations,
legal realism proved to be essentially a conservative movement"). For another in-
sightful review of Kalman's book, see Horwitz, Book Review, 1989 AM. HIST. REV. 94,
299; White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
94. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies ("CLS") was founded in 1977. CLS
scholars continue the realist movement and further argue our political/legal environ-
ment is of our own making and can be restructured. See Tushnet, Critical Legal Stud-
ies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986).
95. See Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) (arguing that the legal studies
critique of society does not provide an adequate basis for a just community); Tushnet,
supra note 94; Note, 'Round and 'Round The Bramble Busk From Legal Realism To
Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982).

